



## Measuring performance in Australia's Job Network (A)

In May 1998, the Liberal-National Coalition Government of Australia introduced “Job Network”, a new way of providing services for unemployed people. Job Network was created using competitive bidding, and hundreds of providers were contracted to deliver employment services on behalf of the Australian Government. Some employment services had already been outsourced under the previous Labor Government's Working Nation scheme. But Job Network went much further, not only in the range of services contracted out, but also in its greater emphasis on paying providers for employment *outcomes* for job seekers: that is, for how good they were at getting unemployed people into jobs.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, job seekers would be able to choose among providers, who would therefore be subject to competitive pressure to perform. For the Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs<sup>2</sup> (subsequently referred to as the department), who had to manage and monitor the new system, it was clear that a new era in employment services had begun.

### Employment services in Australia

In the post war period, Australia has tended to have a relatively low rate of unemployment. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the unemployment rate was just 2 percent. However, through the 1970s unemployment grew to 6 percent and, during a

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<sup>1</sup> Outcome payments were also available under certain circumstances for placing job seekers into accredited education and training courses.

<sup>2</sup> As a result of departmental restructures and machinery of government changes the responsibility of employment services changed from DEETYA in late 1998 to the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business and in November 2001 to the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR).

recession in the early 1980s, the rate climbed to 10 percent. After declining to 6 percent by the late 1980s, another downturn saw the unemployment rate peak at 11 percent in 1993.<sup>3</sup> During this period the actual number of people who were unemployed had increased from around 90,000 in the mid-1960s to almost 600,000 by the end of the century.<sup>4</sup>

Alongside the upward trend in unemployment was an upsurge in the numbers of *long-term* unemployed<sup>5</sup> to almost 250,000 by 1995. This amounted to 32.7 percent of all unemployed people.<sup>6</sup> This had broader effects – for example, evidence suggested that the experience of one family member in long-term unemployment affected other members of the household. For the 250,000 long-term unemployed people in 1995 a further 398,400 family members lived in the same household, including 188,100 dependent children.<sup>7</sup> The effects were potentially inter-generational and widespread.

Since 1946, when the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) was established, the Australian government had been directly involved in providing services to unemployed people. Initially the CES focused on providing employment matching services which brought together job seekers and employers. However, during periods of high unemployment a range of specialised services was trialled, especially for the long-term unemployed. Over the years this led to multiple labour market programs which sought to address the challenges of unemployment.

The CES and the labour market programs it delivered had been the subject of some critical reviews, and the government had announced a series of initiatives since the late 1980s. In 1994, the Keating Labor Government introduced a package of initiatives called “Working Nation”. In addition to a number of changes to benefits, a new emphasis on case management and additional labour market programs, Working Nation increased the extent of outsourcing in the employment services. Community and private sector agencies were contracted to deliver case management and job placement services. The CES would also continue to be responsible for ensuring that the unemployed were meeting their obligations to search for work or undertake labour market programs, as a condition of receiving benefits. To encourage the development of a competitive market of service providers, an Employment Service Regulatory Authority was established.

In 1995, the CES Advisory Committee reviewed operations and proposed major changes to labour market programs on the basis that the current arrangements were “an impediment to maximising outcomes” and that the complexity of guidelines, forms, contracts, processes and constraints were “baffling to all but the very experienced”.<sup>8</sup> The Coalition government, elected in 1996, concurred. The newly appointed Minister for Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, Senator Amanda Vanstone, noted that:

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<sup>3</sup> Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] (2001), *Australian Social Trends*, catalogue. 4102.0.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.* Australia’s total population is just over 20 million people.

<sup>5</sup> The official definition of long-term unemployed, according to the ABS, was being unemployed for more than 52 weeks.

<sup>6</sup> ABS (1996) *The Long Term Unemployed*, in *Year Book Australia*, Catalogue No. 1301.0.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> CES Advisory Committee (1995) *Review of Labour Market Programs*, AGPS, Canberra, p. xi (as cited in Vanstone 1996).

“Current arrangements for labour market assistance emphasise process rather than purpose. Too often, job seekers are churned through costly, ineffective and complex programs via cumbersome and inefficient service delivery arrangements. Under *Working Nation* there was no such thing as an individual, just targets.”<sup>9</sup>

According to Senator Vanstone, the incentive structure of the existing employment services model focused the attention of CES staff on placing job-seekers into programs, such as job search training, work experience or vocational education, rather than on sustainable employment. She argued that whilst many approaches had been trialled over the years in Australia, none had been able to successfully address the individual needs of job-seekers at the same time as delivering policy outcomes.<sup>10</sup>

A major OECD report in 1996 found that this was a common experience in member countries with publicly-run employment services.<sup>11</sup> Also problematic was the organisational separation of employment services from income support. The OECD set out several recommendations for addressing these problems and improving publicly provided employment and income support programs:

- One-stop labour shops integrating job brokerage, income support administration, and job placement;
- More services opened up to competition; and,
- Greater mobility of staff between public and private agencies.

### **A revolution in employment services**

In the 1996-97 Budget, the Australian Government announced major reforms to the delivery of labour market assistance for unemployed people. Senator Vanstone stated that:

“The primary objective of the Government’s reforms is to ensure that labour market assistance has a clear focus on real job outcomes and genuinely makes a difference to those assisted.”<sup>12</sup>

She argued that the reforms would focus attention on outcomes with incentive and payment structures designed to reinforce this. The approach distinguished between two levels of outcomes, which Vanstone explained would now attract different payment levels:

- Primary outcomes – the placement of clients in full-time jobs, apprenticeships or traineeships; and,
- Secondary outcomes – the placement of clients into substantial part-time work or accredited education and training courses.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Senator Amanda Vanstone (1996), *Reforming Employment Assistance: Helping Australians Into Real Jobs*, Budget Statement..

<sup>10</sup> Vanstone (1996).

<sup>11</sup> OECD (1996) *Enhancing the Effectiveness of Active Labour Market Policies: Evidence From Programme Evaluations in OECD Countries*, Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers, No. 18, OECD, Paris.

<sup>12</sup> Vanstone (1996).

<sup>13</sup> Vanstone (1996).

Placing job seekers into short-term programs or training courses would no longer attract an outcome payment, and services would have to become client-focussed rather than program-driven. Senator Vanstone noted that, “the changes proposed are radical and comprehensive, involving the most significant reorganisation of labour market assistance arrangements since the establishment of the CES in 1946.”<sup>14</sup> A series of reform principles was set out:

1. Assistance provided to job seekers should be based on individual need and capacity to benefit by achieving an sustainable employment outcome;
2. Providers should have access to flexible forms of assistance to fit with the needs of job seekers;
3. The incentive framework should reward providers of labour market assistance primarily for placing job seekers in real jobs, with additional incentives for placing those most in need;
4. A competitive market for employment placement services should separate purchasers from providers and ensure that providers operate on the basis of competitive neutrality;
5. Conditions for payment of income support for unemployed people should be linked closely with active employment assistance measures; and,
6. Job seekers and employers should be able to receive high quality and streamlined service from the agencies and providers with which they interact.<sup>15</sup>

Functions that had previously been delivered separately by the CES (employment services) and the Department of Social Security (income support) were integrated in a new service delivery agency, Centrelink, which would offer a single delivery point for job seekers. Centrelink began operating in 1997, providing a uniform national service incorporating: job seeker registration; assessment of eligibility for services; client referral to providers; and, administration of the activity test.<sup>16</sup>

The reforms created a contestable market for employment services – the Job Network – which would be delivered by a range of providers including Employment National, the result of corporatising the CES as a government-owned business. The providers were to offer job seekers differential levels of service based on need. The Government’s key objectives with Job Network were:

1. To deliver a better quality of assistance to unemployed people, leading to better and more sustainable outcomes;
2. To target assistance on the basis of need and capacity to benefit;
3. To address the structural weaknesses and inefficiencies inherent in previous arrangements for labour market assistance, and to put into effect the lessons learnt from international and Australian experiences of labour market assistance; and

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<sup>14</sup> Vanstone (1996).

<sup>15</sup> Vanstone (1996).

<sup>16</sup> Job seekers in receipt of income support were subject to an “activity” test and had to comply with certain activity and reporting requirements to maintain their allowances. This might include, for example, participation in the Work-for-the-Dole scheme.

#### 4. To achieve better value for money.<sup>17</sup>

On 4 August 1997 the department released the Employment Services Request for Tender. It covered a range of services across 29 labour market regions and was estimated to cost \$1.7 billion over 19 months.<sup>18</sup> When the request for tender closed on 16 September 1997, 5300 bids had been received from over 1000 organisations. Following an evaluation process it was announced, in February 1998, that more than 300 organisations had successfully won contracts (*Exhibit 1* sets out the results in detail). This included many providers who had previously been funded to deliver employment services such as individual case management for long-term unemployed people. Indeed 56 percent of tenderers and 79 percent of successful tenderers had been providers under Working Nation.<sup>19</sup>

### **The creation of Job Network**

Job Network was a means of focusing providers on employment outcomes.<sup>20</sup> According to one official, “Job Network has simple objectives: we want to get people into a job”. To this end, at its inception the long-term goal was to have providers earning more than 50 percent of their income based on outcome payments. When the network commenced operations in May 1998, more than 300 providers (private, community and government) began offering services from around 1400 sites across Australia. This was a considerable increase on prior arrangements, where there had been around 700 outlets including 293 CES offices and 321 specialised case management providers operating under contracts.

In this first round, the Job Network was built around four key services<sup>21</sup> which represented different levels of assistance to help people in gaining employment: Self-Service; Job Matching; Job Search Training; and, Intensive Assistance (see *Exhibit 2*).<sup>22</sup> Many job seekers’ first interaction with the Job Network was at a Centrelink office when they sought income support. There they were interviewed by agency staff, and the Job Seeker Classification Instrument (JSCI) was administered to determine their relative labour market disadvantage (see *Exhibit 3*). The score on the JSCI allowed for the streaming of job seekers into appropriate levels of service, and also set the payment level for an employment outcome. A brief explanation of each is provided below:

1: *Self-Service* systems provided the first tier of service in the Job Network. These services were available to all job seekers regardless of whether they were in receipt of

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<sup>17</sup> Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business [DEWRSB] (2000) *Job Network Evaluation Stage One: Implementation and Market Development*, Canberra, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup> DEWRSB (2000, p. 24).

<sup>19</sup> DEWRSB (2000, p.24).

<sup>20</sup> To be eligible for payment based on an “employment outcome” a provider had to place an eligible job seeker into an eligible vacancy for at least fifteen hours over a period of not more than five consecutive days (DEWRSB, 2000, p. 47).

<sup>21</sup> Changes were made to the services in subsequent rounds to improve performance and ensure that greater emphasis was placed on keeping job seekers who remain unemployed actively engaged with the employment services, see [www.jobnetwork.gov.au](http://www.jobnetwork.gov.au).

<sup>22</sup> Two other services were covered by the first Job Network tender: New Enterprise Incentive Scheme (which helped unemployed people start their own business) and Entry Level Training Scheme which was designed to streamline services to employers, apprentices and trainees.

income support. At a Centrelink office, job seekers could access, free-of-charge, a range of facilities including: (a) job vacancy displays on touch screens and through the Australian Job Database (also available at all Job Network providers); (b) information on local service providers; and, (c) information on other avenues for assistance such as migrant services, health services and local initiatives.<sup>23</sup>

2: *Job Matching* focused on assisting job seekers to find vacancies and employers to find suitable personnel. When Job Network commenced, eligibility for this service was limited to job seekers in receipt of income support, Community Development Employment Project (CDEP) participants,<sup>24</sup> and unemployed young people aged 15-20.<sup>25</sup> Job seekers received a Job Network card which was used to demonstrate their eligibility to providers and they were able to register with up to five providers of their choice at any one time.

An important role of providers was to canvass employers for vacancies and then register them on the National Vacancy Data Base. Job seekers were then able to access the database via touch screens at Centrelink offices, via Job Network providers and on the Internet. Providers also assisted employers by screening applicants to ensure they were suitable for vacancies.

Job Matching was a competitive multi-provider service and provider payments were linked to employment outcomes on the basis of their tendered fee. Fees varied but at the start of Job Network the average was \$200 per successful job placement. There were almost 250 Job Network providers operating across 1200 sites delivering Job Matching services.

3: *Job Search Training* (JST) aimed to ensure that work-ready job seekers had the skills required to apply for and obtain employment. This service was specifically targeted at individuals who demonstrated both a need for the service and a capacity to benefit. Selection was based on (a) job readiness; (b) a lack of job search skills; and, (c) the potential to achieve a sustainable employment outcome. To be eligible, job seekers must have been registered as unemployed for at least three months and be either: (a) in receipt of government income support; (b) aged 15 to 20 and not in full-time training or education; (c) a CDEP participant; or (d) returning to the workforce after two years of unpaid care giving.<sup>26</sup> Centrelink staff identified eligible job seekers and provided them with a list of relevant providers. Job seekers could then choose a provider or be referred by Centrelink.

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<sup>23</sup> This service was not tendered but was built around some of the outputs of the tender process e.g. the National Vacancy Database was based on vacancies registered by Job Network providers.

<sup>24</sup> The Community Development Employment Project program began in 1977 and was specifically focussed on community development and the creation of employment opportunities for Indigenous Australians.

<sup>25</sup> From August 1998 this service was extended to people working less than 15 hours per week who were not in full-time employment or in receipt of income support. An initial limit was placed on providers which meant that no more than 20 percent of their work could be for these newly eligible clients. The limit was removed in December 1998.

<sup>26</sup> JST was aimed at those unemployed for between six and twelve months and not eligible for Intensive Assistance, however it is available to some job seekers unemployed for between three and six months, or unemployed for more than twelve months where it was deemed appropriate.

The department largely allowed providers to determine the most appropriate service that clients needed. However, several activities were obligatory:

- Job seekers had to be interviewed by the provider;
- Providers had to undertake an assessment and identification of individual job seekers' needs and barriers to employment;
- A job search plan had to be developed and negotiated for each eligible job seeker;
- Support and practical experience in job search had to be provided (e.g. assistance in preparing a job application); and,
- Job seekers had to be provided with access to newspapers, word processors, photocopiers, telephones, faxes and mail at no charge.<sup>27</sup>

Following on from the initial interview between the job seeker and the provider, the provider advised Centrelink as to whether the job seeker would benefit from JST. If it was deemed that JST was not appropriate, the job seeker was referred back to Centrelink for reassessment.<sup>28</sup> Once an individual's specific needs were identified, the job seeker and the provider negotiated and signed a job search skills plan. JST was then delivered over a fifteen-day period to help prepare individual job seekers for returning to standard working patterns. Providers' approaches varied, but it was common for JST to be delivered to groups of job seekers in three week courses covering counselling, interview techniques and résumé writing.

The price paid by the government for JST was dependent on the level of service proposed by the provider, employment opportunities in the region, and the actual cost of service delivery.<sup>29</sup> When Job Network commenced 117 Job Network providers delivered JST at 419 sites across Australia including 25 specialist providers delivering services to indigenous job seekers, long-term unemployed people, mature-aged people, people from non-English speaking backgrounds, people with disabilities, sole parents, women and youth. Table 1 sets out the costs of JST compared to the previous program in place.

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<sup>27</sup> DEWRSB (2000, p. 60).

<sup>28</sup> From December 1998 providers were able to identify and nominate job seekers that they believed would benefit from JST and these job seekers are then assessed by Centrelink to determine if they were eligible.

<sup>29</sup> DEWRSB (2000)

**Table 1: Unit costs and cost per unsubsidised employment outcome<sup>30</sup>**

Program	Unit cost (\$) <sup>31</sup>	Cost per unsubsidised employment outcome (\$) <sup>32</sup>
Job Search Training (Job Network)	418	1130
Job Club (Working Nation)	625	2500

4: *Intensive Assistance* (IA) provided tailored services to long-term unemployed or disadvantaged people to assist them in addressing their specific barriers to employment. Various services were provided, including counselling, subsidies to employers, vocational training, work experience, literacy and numeracy education, assistance with job search skills and post-employment support. IA could continue for up to 12 or 18 months depending on the classification level of the job seeker. In most cases job seekers were able to choose their provider from those operating in the local area, and payments to providers were mainly tied to employment outcomes.

The application of the JSCI by Centrelink was used to classify individuals in terms of the level of assistance necessary. Table 2 sets out the scores related to the various levels of funding.

**Table 2: Job seeker Classification Instrument “Bandwidths”<sup>33</sup>**

Assistance level	JSCI Score Bandwidth <sup>34</sup>			Target proportion of places (%)
	Date	01/05/1998	23/07/1998	
Level 1	27-34 points	26-33 points	24-30 points	67
Level 2	35-44 points	34-41 points	31-38 points	26
Level 3	45 points or more	42 points or more	39 points or more	7

Payments were structured around three levels, reflecting the relative difficulty of placing an individual job seeker, and this ensured that higher fees were paid for the most disadvantaged (see Table 3). Payments were made in three stages: (a) up-front service fees; (b) interim outcome payments; and, (c) final outcome payments. The up-

<sup>30</sup> DEWRSB (2000, p.67).

<sup>31</sup> Unit costs for JST included program costs (i.e. payments for providers) and a component for administrative costs but did not include Centrelink costs. Job Club unit costs included program costs and Formal Training Allowance payments to program participants but did not include departmental administrative costs.

<sup>32</sup> A subsidised employment outcome involved a payment to employers to encourage them to hire long-term unemployed job seekers and included a wage subsidy. An unsubsidised employment outcome did not include any wage subsidy.

<sup>33</sup> DEWRSB (2000, p. 74).

<sup>34</sup> Note that some adjustments were made in the first fourteen months of Job Network to ensure there was a sufficient pool of job seekers in each location to fill the number of places that providers had contracted for.

front service fee provided initial funds which providers could use to assist job seekers. If the job seeker remained in employment for 13 weeks the providers could claim an interim outcome payment and, if they remained for 26 weeks, a final outcome payment could be claimed.

Providers were given considerable flexibility in delivering intensive assistance, to ensure that the service was tailored to individual job seekers. However there were important parts of the service that the provider had to deliver:

- They had to determine the appropriate activity requirement for individual jobseekers (within guidelines);
- They had to include these requirements in an activity agreement or contract with the client;
- They had to monitor compliance with the activity requirements; and,
- They were required to notify Centrelink if the job seeker breached the agreed requirements.<sup>35</sup>

**Table 3: Payment structure for Intensive Assistance<sup>36</sup>**

Funding level	Up-Front Service Fee (\$)	Interim Outcome Payment <sup>37</sup>		Final Outcome Payment	
		Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Level 1	1500	1500	500	1200	500
Level 2	2250	2250	500	2200	500
Level 3	3000	3200	500	3000	500

## Conclusion

When Job Network commenced operation in May 1998, it reflected a marked change in emphasis. The government had moved from a publicly-provided service that prescribed programs for job seekers to the purchase of employment outcomes from a diverse range of providers. As a departmental official explained:

“We give the provider a client with a set of characteristics, they get the outcomes and then we pay for it. This means the providers do what they need to do to meet our objectives.”

With hundreds of agencies operating in the new market, departmental staff had the challenge of monitoring what was going on across the network.

<sup>35</sup> Vanstone (1996). Where a job seeker was found to breach their agreement this could result in suspension of income support in some cases.

<sup>36</sup> DEWRSB (2000, p. 73).

<sup>37</sup> A primary payment was made where the job seeker was in receipt of Newstart or Youth Allowance and remained in employment, unsubsidised self-employment, an apprenticeship or traineeship and earned sufficient income to cease receipt of their allowance for 13 consecutive weeks. A secondary payment was made where the same type of job seeker earned sufficient income to reduce their allowance by at least 70 percent averaged over 13 consecutive weeks.

## Exhibit 1: Results of the first Job Network tender<sup>38</sup>

**Table A (i): Job Network services by number of organisations and sites**

<b>Service</b>	<b>Number of Job Network members</b>	<b>Number of sites</b>
Job Matching	240	936
Job Search Training	117	419
Intensive Assistance	125	715
NEIS	64	194
New Apprenticeships Centres	59	200
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>1404</b>

**Table A (ii): Number of Job Network Services by Sites and Specialist Services (May 1998)**


<b>Specialist service</b>	<b>Job Matching</b>	<b>Job Search Training</b>	<b>Intensive Assistance</b>	<b>NEIS</b>
Long-term unemployed	23	5	17	-
Mature-aged	12	1	12	3
Indigenous	25	7	19	-
Non-English speaking background	42	18	26	6
Person with disability	48	12	34	3
Sole Parents	5	1	3	1
Women	5	1	6	6
Youth	59	20	41	6
Other	15	8	11	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>26</b>

<sup>38</sup> Tables taken from Job Network Evaluation Stage 1 2000:26-27.

**Table A (iii): Job Network services by number of sites and labour market region (May 1998)**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Job Matching</b>	<b>Job Search Training</b>	<b>Intensive Assistance</b>	<b>NEIS</b>	<b>New Apprenticeships Centres</b>
Inner Sydney	39	12	19	5	3
South West	72	26	42	11	10
Western Sydney	45	10	26	9	5
North Sydney & Central Coast	41	12	25	4	7
Hunter & North Coast	77	24	46	19	13
Illawarra & South East NSW	47	25	36	11	7
Western NSW	55	34	41	9	4
Australian Capital Territory	18	4	14	3	8
Riverina	47	22	21	7	9
West & Inner Melbourne	75	19	52	13	9
East Melbourne	88	27	63	16	10
Geelong	26	7	19	2	6
Victorian Central Highlands	45	24	27	8	22
Gippsland	25	12	17	14	7
Brisbane City	67	20	32	5	15
Moreton	58	23	34	6	13
Wide Bay-Burnett	23	7	13	6	4
Darling Downs	18	11	8	2	1
Central Queensland	23	9	14	3	7
Northern Queensland	39	14	17	2	7
Adelaide	56	15	37	6	8
Southern & Eastern South Australian	20	6	10	4	5
Northern & Western South Australia	22	7	11	2	6
Perth	55	11	36	6	8
Southern West Australia	20	12	10	17	6
Balance of West Australia	25	9	14	3	7
Hobart & Southern Tasmania	20	5	15	4	4
Northern Tasmania & Mersey-Lyell	22	10	14	5	8
Northern Territory	15	10	15	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1180</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>728</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>220</b>

**Exhibit 2: The flow of clients into labour market assistance as proposed<sup>39</sup>**



<sup>39</sup> Adapted from Senator Amanda Vanstone (1996), Minister for Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, *Reforming Employment Assistance – Helping Australians Into Real Jobs*, Budget Statement.

### Exhibit 3: The Job Seeker Classification Instrument

The Job Seeker Classification Instrument (JSCI) was designed as an objective means of measuring a job seeker’s relative labour market disadvantage and to allow Centrelink staff to immediately identify those at risk of long-term unemployment. The JSCI was used to stream clients in the Job Network system and determine where they “fit” on the continuum of services in terms of eligibility. Around 10 percent% of job seekers were expected to fit into the highly disadvantaged group and therefore be eligible for Intensive Support.

The JSCI was developed through a statistical model which allocated points according to a range of factors. These weightings reflected the independent effects of each factor on the predicted probability of a job seeker becoming long-term unemployed after controlling for the influence of all other factors included in the model.

Job seekers registered at Centrelink where the JSCI was administered. In this process the individual answered up to thirty questions in a face-to-face interview. The JSCI score was based on fourteen factors and points were assigned to the response to each question.<sup>40</sup> This allowed for a total JSCI score to be developed. The higher the score, the higher the level of relative disadvantage. Table C(i) sets out the JSCI factors and points and Table C(ii) sets out the scores related to different levels of assistance.

**Table C (i): The Job Seeker Classification Instrument: factors and points allocated<sup>41</sup>**

Note: JSCI factors and points allocated to these factors have subsequently been revised.

JSCI Factor	Points: Male	Points: Female
<b>Age and gender</b>		
15-19	0	4
20-24	0	0
25-29	1	1
30-34	2	3
35-39	3	4
40-44	4	6
45-49	5	6
50-54	8	7
55+	8	7
<b>Personal characteristics requiring professional or specialist judgement<sup>42</sup></b>		
• No impact	0	0
• Low impact	4	4
• Medium impact	9	9
• High impact	12	12

<sup>40</sup> Amendments to the JSCI process in April 2003 reduced the number of questions from 60 to 30 and the number of factors from 18 to 14.

<sup>41</sup> Job Seekers Classification Instrument (JSCI) available on [www.workplace.gov.au](http://www.workplace.gov.au)

<sup>42</sup> Represents a range of factors such as: motivation, confidence, self-esteem, personal presentation; psychological problems; substance abuse problems; or experience of trauma or torture.

<b>Language and literacy</b>		
• Good speaking, writing and reading skills	0	0
• Poor speaking, writing and reading skills	4	4
• Combination of levels	1	1
<b>Indigenous/Australian born South Sea Islander status</b>		
• Aboriginal and/or Torres trait Islander	11	11
• Australian born South Sea Islander	9	9
• Non-indigenous	0	0
• Declined to Answer	0	0
<b>Disability or medical condition</b>		
• No disabilities	0	0
• One disability	3	3
• Multiple disability	5	5
• Declined to answer	0	0
<b>Country of Birth</b>		
• Australia, North America, North West Europe, Oceania, South America, Southern Europe, South East Asia (2), United Kingdom and Ireland	0	0
• Central America, North East Asia, South East Africa	1	1
• Eastern Europe, South Asia, South East Asia (1), South East Europe	2	2
• North West Africa, Other	3	3
• West Africa	4	4
<b>Recency of work experience (prior 2 years)</b>		
• Full-time work	0	0
• Part-time work (8-35 hours)	2	2
• Part-time work (less than 8 hours)	5	5
• Sessional or irregular casual work	1	1
• Unpaid work	6	6
• Not in the labour force (e.g. studying, caring)	5	5
• Not working but looking for work (unemployed)	6	6
<b>Geographic location (% of ESA unemployed)<sup>43</sup></b>		
• Very low disadvantage (<5%)	0	0
• Low disadvantage (5.0-5.9%)	1	1
• Low to moderate disadvantage (6.0-6.9%)	2	2
• Moderate disadvantage (7.0-7.9%)	3	3
• Moderate to high disadvantage (8.0-8.9%)	4	4
• High disadvantage (9.0-9.9%)	6	6
• Very high disadvantage (10.0-10.9%)	7	7
• Extremely high disadvantage (>=11.0%)	8	8
<b>Stability of residence</b>		
• Not homeless or insecure accommodation	0	0
• Homeless or insecure accommodation	6	6
<b>Vocational qualifications</b>		
• Yes	0	0
• Yes, but not useful	1	1
• No	2	2
<b>Educational attainment</b>		
• Special school	6	6

<sup>43</sup> Scores reflect the labour market disadvantage associated with living in a particular location, in particular the level of unemployment which is linked to local economic factors. All job seekers live in one of the 137 Employment Service Areas (ESAs) across Australia.

• Primary school (year 7,8 or 9)	6	6
• Year 10 completed	4	4
• Year 11 completed	4	4
• Year 12 completed	3	3
• Trade/TAFE	3	3
• Associate diploma	3	3
• Degree	0	0
• Post graduate	0	0
• Attended special unit in mainstream school	6	6
• Did not go to school	6	6
<b><i>Family status and living arrangements</i></b>		
• Lone parent	4	4
• Husband/wife/defacto	0	0
• Lives with other family	0	0
• Lives with non-family	0	0
Lives alone	1	1
<b><i>Disclosed ex-offender</i></b>		
• Not ex-offender	0	0
• Yes – sentence < 1 month	3	3
• Yes – sentence > 1 month	8	8
• Yes – no sentence	2	2
• Declined to answer	0	0
<b><i>Contactability</i></b>		
Contactable by phone	0	0
Not contactable by phone	2	2